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countries. 
The  present  report  covers  the  years  1983  and  1984.  Since  negotiations 
for  the  new  Lome  Convention,  signed  in  lace  1984,  were  going  on  for 
much  of  this  period,  the  Commission  and  Bank  have  thought  best  not 
simply  to update  the  essentially quantitative  information  contained  in 
previous  reports1  but  to  undertake  a  more  qualitative assessment, 
considering  inter alia certain  fundamental  points  which  arose  during 
those  negotiat1ons,  including  the  tax  treatment  of  Community-financed 
operations  and  the  ACP  States•  external  debt.  The  same  consideration, 
however,  justifies the  continued  inclusion  of  a  number  of  sensitive 
issues  whose  persistence  highlights  the  practical difficulties  in the 
way  of  Community  aid  operations:  problems  with  project  implementation 
and  the  recovery  of  Loan  repayments,  and  the  continuing efforts of  the 
funding  bodies  to  improve  contract  payment  procedures.  This  report 
also  contains  two  new  items  not  previously  covered:  a  preliminary 
estimate of  project  cost  overruns  (the  main  quantitative  component) 
together  with  suggestions  for  avoiding  their  recurrence;  and,  in  response 
to  requests  formulated  by  the  Member  States  when  earlier  reports  were 
discussed,  a  consideration of  project  evaluation,  which  gives  some 
indication  of  how  Community  aid  is used  - we  have  here  been  concerned, 
however,  to  avoid going over  ground  already  covered  in  reports  or 
com~unications submitted  to  the  Council  in other  connections. 
1coM<80)107,  24  April  1980 
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I.  General  problems  of  implementation 
As  the  Commission  has  made  clear  in  previous  reports,  problems  with  the 
implementation of  aid  arise at all  stages  of  a  project  from  identification 
to  full  operational  status.  Without  over-generalizing  - for  such 
problems  are  not  necessarily  encountered  in all  ACP  countries,  or  at 
all  stages  of  a  project  in  a  given  country  - such  difficulties are  to 
a  great  extent  the  result  of  Local  administrative  shortcomings.  The 
Community  has  raised  these  matters  with  its partners  at  meetings  of 
the  Article  108  Committee  set  up  by  Lome  II.  In  the  present  report 
we  will  simply  be  Looking  at  one  or  two  of  these  characteristic  problems 
in  the  light  of  the  most  recent  experience  with  EEC-ACP  financial  and 
technical  cooperation.  They  can  be  classified  under  three  broad 
headings:  administrative  delays,  administrative  incapacity,  and 
dispersal  of  responsibilities. 
(a)  Administrative  delays  occur  at  various  stages  from  project 
identification onwards,  and  while  most  indicative  programmes  were  rapidly 
drawn  up,  not  all  ACP  States  managed  to  select  individual  projects  within 
a  reasonable  time.  In  Guinea,  for  instance,  three  and  a  half  years  after 
Lome  II  came  into  force  approved  projects  had  been  found  for  Less  than  a 
quarter  of  the  indicative  programme. 
Considerable  delays  are  also  encountered  in  the  signing  of  financing 
agreements  and  Loan  contracts.  In  reality the  problem  is  not  so  marked 
with  financing  agreements  proper,  being  significant  only  in  the  case  of 
certain  regional  projects  requiring  the  signatures of  more  than  one 
country;  where  major  delays  do  often occur  is  with  the  financing  contracts 
relating  to  special  Loans.  A Loan  contract  sent  to  Trinidad  and  Tobago 
in  1980,  for  instance,  was  not  signed  until  1984.  Such  delays  are  rarely 
caused  by  substantive  problems  with  contract  clauses;  instead,  they 
reflect  the  frequent  inability of  ACP  countries  to  complete  the  necessary 
formalities  with  dispatch,  since  the  approval  of  numerous  administrative 
or  financial  bodies  may  be  required. - 3  -
There  are  also  numerous  instances  of  ACP  States  having difficulty  in 
carrying out  projects  properly on  schedule.  In  Lesotho,  for  example, 
there  are  generally  delays  in  the  issue  of  provisional  acceptance  papers 
for  contract  supplies,  while  countries  Like  Niger,  Somalia  and  Liberia 
have  been  dilatory  in  providing  the  auxiliary  services  (e.g.  electricity 
supplies)  needed  to  enable  projects  to  stnrt  up  in  time. 
Cb)  A second  source  of  problems  concerns  the  actual  ability of  the 
administration  in  certain  countries  to  fulfil  the  duties  incumbent  on 
them  under  the  Lome  Convention.  In  many  cases  the  Local  administration 
proves  unable  to prepare  invitation to tender  dossiers  unaided,  even  if 
it  has  undertaken  to  do  so  without  the  help  of  a  technical  assistant. 
Similarly,  in  some  ACP  countries  the  Commission  has  had  to  prepare  EDF 
payment  orders,  collect  the  supporting  documents  and  get  them  signed  by 
the  national  authorizing  officer  and  the ministries  concerned. 
(c)  The  study of  specific  typical  cases  of  the difficulties encountered 
in  financial  and  technical  cooperation activities  has  brought  to  Light  a 
problem  which  can  be  regarded  as  Lying  at  the  root  of  a  number  of  the 
shortcomings  detected:  the  tendency  towards  fragmentation  of  responsibility 
for  decision-making.  Uganda  is  typical  in this  regard.  Project 
identification  is delayed  because  the  approval  of  some  fifty officials 
must  be  sought  before  a  project  request  can  be  finalized.  There  is,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  Central  Tender  Board  which  is  empowered  to  award  all 
government  contracts  and  does  so  quite  promptly.  There  should  be  a 
similar  centralization of  responsibilities at  other  stages  of  the  project 
procedure,  and  other  countries  might  usefully  follow  the  same  example, 
if necessary  with  the  help  of  technical  assistance. - 4  -
The  Bank  Lends  money  not  only  to  ACP  governments  but  also  in  many  cases  to 
state,  semi-state or  private  concerns,  whose  management  structures  are 
generally  such  as  to  prevent  most  of  the  problems  encountered  by  the 
Commission. 
Nevertheless,  because  of  general  economic  and  financial  problems  and 
sometimes  also  of  domestic  political  considerations  or  administrative 
red  tape,  some  ACP  States  have  been  Late  or  remiss  in  fulfilling  their 
duties  or  have  blocked  or  delayed  the  release  of  resources  needed  to 
complete  or  commission  theoretically "priority•• projects.  Thus  a  number 
of  Bank-financed  projects  are  or  have  been  faced  with  oust~cles for  which 
the  main  responsibility  Lies  with  the  ACP  State  itself, necessitating 
constant  monitoring  of  the  progress  of  those  projects  and  efforts  to  find 
ways  of  enabling  the  economic  objectives  to  be  fulfilled.  Here  are  some 
examples  of  these  problems: 
delays  in  the  payment  by  a  country  of  its share  of  the  financing, 
budget  contributions  or  administrative bills  (Regie  du  Chemin  de  Fer 
Abidjan-Niger  CRAN)  in  Ivory  Coast/Burkina  Faso;  Societe  Ivoirienne 
d•engrais  CSIVENG)  in  Ivory  Coast;  and  the  Liberia  Electricity  Corporation 
CLEC)  project); 
- late or  incomplete  coverage  of  foreign  exchange  requirements  (the  LEC 
project  in  Liberia,  and  Morogoro  Canvas  Mill  and  Tanganyika  Development 
Finance  CTDFL)  in  Tanzania); 
postponements  or  major  delays  in  the  prov1s1on  of  supporting 
infrastructure or  back-up  investments  (development  of  tourist  facilities 
in  Mali,  Gezira  Managil  Textile  Company  CGEMATEX)  1n  Sudan). 
These  drawbacks  often  go  hand  in  hand  with  problems  in  the  way  the  aid  is 
actually  used. - 5  -
II.  Taxation 
As  regards  implementation  of  Lome  II,  which  is still under  way,  the  tax 
and  customs  treatment  of  Community-financed  contracts  is defined  in 
Protocol  No  6  to  the  Convention.  Article  1  of  that  Protocol  provides 
that  EDF  contracts  shall  be  subject  to  tar.  and  customs  arrangements 
"no  Less  favourable  than  those applied  vis-a-vis  the  most  favoured  State 
or  most  favoured  international  development  organization",  and  Articles 
2  to  12  lay  down  a  number  of  more  specific  rules. 
Like the  Community,  other donors  operate  on  the  principle that  no  tax 
should  be  paid  in  an  ACP  State on  contracts  financed  as  part  of  their 
aid  programmes.  Member  States of  the  Community  and  the  World  Bank 
confirm  that  no  tax  is  levied  on  the  external  cost  component  of  their 
aid  programmes.  Throughout  the  ACP  States  the  World  Bank  and  at  least 
one  EC~  Member  State's bilateral  aid  agency  have  been  granted  exemption 
from  all  taxes. 
Enquiries  addressed  by  the  Commission  in  1983  to  its  Delegates,  however, 
revealed that  in  at  Least  30  ACP  States  the  EDF  had  not  enjoyed 
most-favoured  tax  status;  in  18  other  ACP  countries,  by  contrast,  the 
Community  had  obtained  either  most-favoured  tax  treatment  or  full 
exemption  from  taxes. 
The  problems  which  have  arisen  with  the  application of  Protocol  No  6 
are  due  not  only  to  its misinterpretation by  some  ACP  States  in  the  light 
most  advantageous  to  themselves,  but  to  the  outright  refusal  of  some 
countries  to  apply  it  at  all,  even  when  its provisions  are  perfectly 
clear,  and  in  spite of  their obligations  under  the  Lome  Convention 
(Protocol  No  6  forms  part  of  the  binding  provisions  of  the  Convention). 
The  Commission  estimates  that  some  100  million  ECU  or  approximately  6% 
of  the  indicative  programmes  of  26  ACP  States  will  be  creamed  off  by 
those  countries'  tax  systems  if the  present  rules  continue  to  be  applied 
until  the  Lome  II  indicative  programmes  are  complete.  Around  half  of 
that  figure  is made  up  of  tax  paid on  projects  already  approved;  the 
remainder  represents  tax  which  would  be  payable  on  future  contracts. 
A Large  proportion  of  the  tax  Levied  relates to works  contracts, 
accounting  for  up  to  35%  of  the  value  of  EDF-financed  works  contracts. - 6  -
Without  a  doubt  the  levying  of  such  taxes  and  the  uncertainty  as  to 
their  incidence  has  prompted  tenderers  to  raise  the  prices  of  their 
bids  to  cover  the  tax  bill  (or  the  risk  of  taxation)  in  ACP  States. 
In  addition,  the  negotiation  and  signing of  EDF  contracts  have  been 
delayed  because  of  contractors'  uncertainty  on  the  question  of  taxation. 
The  net  result  of  ACP  tax  problems  has  been  to  inflate the  cost  of  EDF 
contracts  and  ~elay and  complicate  their execution  to  the  direct 
detriment  of  the  ACP  States  themselves. 
Against  such  a  background  the  Community  proposed  to  the  ACP  States  that 
under  Lome  III  project  and  programme  financing  should  enjoy  freedom  from 
all  tax  and  customs  charges.  The  ACP  States  refused,  however,  and  the 
arrangements  for  the  new  Convention  are  similar  to  those  in  Protocol  No  6. 
Nevertheless,  on  the  strength of  the  findings  it uncovered  in  its 
enquiries  to  Delegates  the  Commission  is determined  that  in  future  the 
ACP  States  must  comply  with  their  undertakings  on  this score;  this will 
be  a  sine  qua  non  for  the  grant  of  financing.  A rule  of  "the  whole 
Protocol,  though  nothing  but  the  Protocol"  should  Lead  to full  exemption 
in  a  substantial  number  of  ACP  States. 
The  Bank  for  its part  accepts  the practice  of  including  taxes  when  a 
project  is  drawn  up,  its costs  worked  out  and  the  comprehensive  financing 
plan  established.  It  takes  care,  however,  to  see  that  all  payment  of 
taxes  or  other  fiscal  dues  is  contractually  excluded  from  the  sums  it 
transfers  to  borrowers  for  the  purchase  of  goods  or  services  it  finances. - 7  -
III.  Improving  payment  procedures 
In  the  interests of  maintaining  the  European  Development  Fund's  reputation 
as  a  "good  payer"  the  Commission  has  consistently  sought  ways  to  speed  up 
payment  procedures,  while  providing  the  n~cessary safeguards  for  the 
project  supervisory  authorities.  The  1982  decision to  cut  down  the 
number  of  payment  instalments  for  supply  contracts  was  discussed  in  the 
preceding  report,  and  since  then  the  Commission  has  been  working  on  two 
further  changes:  first,  it has  been  moving  towards  an  alignment  of  special 
loan  payment  procedures  on  those  for  grants,  and  second,  it has  been 
discussing  with  the  interested parties  the  possibility of  easing  the  rules 
governing  the  provision of  performance  bonds. 
(a)  Until  May  1983  the  Commission,  like  the  Bank,  transferred credits  to 
the  c0rrower  who  in  turn  had  to pay  the  contractors,  the  aim  being  to  keep 
clear  for  firms  the  distinction  between  the  supervisory  authority/borrower 
and  the  Commission/lender  and  to  involve  the  recipient  authorities directly 
in execution  of  the  Loans. 
In  practice this  two-step  process  proved  increasingly  unsatisfactory,  with 
more  and  more  delays  due  essentially to  failings  on  the  part  of  the 
administrations  concerned. 
In  these  circumstances  it was  decided  to allow  borrowers,  if  they  so 
wished,  to  have  special  loans  dealt  with  in  the  same  way  as  grants,  i.e. 
the  Commission  would  pay  the  money  direct  to  the  contractor  on  the 
borrower's  instructions. 
However,  two  conditions  attach  to  the  new  procedure: 
1.  it  is  not  automatic;  it  cannot  be  used  against  the  wishes  of  the 
borrower  who  prefers  to  continue  with  the  old arrangements; 
2.  it is essential  to obtain either  case-by-case or  blanket  authorization 
in  advance  from  the authority  responsible  for  the  management  of  the 
ACP  country's  external  debt  in  order  to  prevent  any  subsequent  dispute 
about  execution  of  the  special  Loan. - 8  -
Use  of  the  direct  payment  system  for  special  Loans  represents  a 
substantial  procedural  streamlining  which  should speed  up  payments  while 
offering  the  same  safeguards  which  have  already  proved  their  worth  with 
grants. 
The  Delegates  were  asked  in  a  circular dated  19  May  1983  to  inform  their 
interlocutors  in  the  ACP  States of  the  availability of  the  new  formula. 
(b)  The  Commission  had  its attention drawn  to  criticisms  made  by  certain 
banks  of  the  system  whereby  contractors  are  required  to  Lodge  a  deposit 
to guarantee  the  refund  of  sums  paid  to  them  in  the  event  of  unsatisfactory 
performance.  The  critics alleged  that  obliging  suppliers  to put  up  a 
bond  in  respect  of  the  first  60%  instalment  (payable  with  the  order)  which 
is only  redeemable  at  the  time  of  provisional  acceptance  imposes  a  burden 
on  businesses,  and  that  other  practices  current  in  international  trade 
such  as  Letters  of  credit  or  stand-by  arrangements  would  allow  payment  in 
full  without  the  need  to  Lodge  a  deposit. 
The  Commission  took  the  point  and  has  been  considering  this question  in 
Liaison  with  the  interested parties,  who  have  provided  further  details of 
these  arrangements.  Talks  are still going  on  (at  mid-1985),  but  the 
Commission  now  feels,  whatever  the  subsequent  findings,  that  the  suggested 
new  system  would  offer  Less  protection to  the  ACP  States,  since  payment 
would  take  place  simply  on  presentation  of  the  documents  when  the  goods 
were  shipped  and  not  on  their acceptance  at  the  other  end  in  good  working 
order,  not  to  mention  the  cash  problems  for  the  Commission  if  payment  in 
full  through  the  Community's  paying  bodies  became  the  rule.  The  Commission 
also  Learned  from  contractors  that  the  financial  burden  associated  with  the 
deposit  system  is  due  to  the  inflexibility of  some  Member  States'  banking 
systems  rather  than  the  guarantee  mechanism  itself;  some  banks,  for  instance, 
require  firms  to  give  a  deposit  before  the  guarantee  is  issued,  which - 9  -
clearly  removes  the  whole  point  of  the  60%  "advance''  paid  as  the  first 
payment  instalment.  Thus  while  the  Commission  is  not  ruling out  some 
relaxation  of  the  guarantee  system  hitherto  in  use  for  EDF-financed 
contracts,  it  intends  to  proceed  only  after  mature  consideration  and 
with  the  assurance  that  the  banks  concerned  have  assimilated all  the 
"ins  and  outs"  of  the  traditional  EDF  method. 
Given  its  internal  operating  procedures  and  the  fact  that  its  Loans  in 
many  cases  account  for  only  a  small  proportion  of  a  project,  the  Bank 
is  not  in  a  position  to settle directly  with  contractors  working  for  its 
borrowers.1  However,  its  range  of  disbursement  procedures  gives  it the 
flexibility  to deal  efficiently with  the  different  situations  which  arise, 
taking  into  account  the  particular circumstances  of  borrowers  as  well  as 
ACP  States. 
The  best  safeguards  are  offered  by  the  system  of  refinancing  on  the  basis 
of  documentary  proof  of  payments  effected or  work  carried  out  by  the 
borrower,  since this  allows  the  Bank  to  pay  out  the  Loan  as  and  when 
performance  progresses,  and  monitor  the  rate of  commitment  of  the 
borrower's  own  funds  and  the  payments  of  co-financiers.  This  is  the 
preferred  procedure  for  both  Local  currency  and  foreign  exchange  payments. 
However,  the  Bank  also  uses  more  flexible  prefinancing  methods  on  a 
case-by-case  basis  to  cope  with  the  specific  problems  of  some  borrowers, 
particularly  in  cases  where  borrowers  experience difficulties  in  getting 
permission  to buy  or  transfer  foreign  currencies.  The  borrower  then  has 
to  provide  regular  proof  for  each  tranche  of  how  the  money  has  been  used 
before  any  new  payments  are  made. 
The  Bank  also  has  special  procedures  for  paying  up  both  equity  it acquires 
direct,  using  risk  capital,  on  behalf  of  the  Community,  and  share-holdings 
subscribed  by  governments  or development  finance  bodies  using  funds 
supplied  by  the  Bank. 
1The  only  exception  is  for  risk  capital  Loans  to  tinance  studies  or 
technical  assistance,  when  the  borrower  - usually  a  government,  but 
sometimes  a  development  bank  - has  formally  to  acknowledge  itself 
debtor  for  the  sums  paid direct  to  the  consultant  as  performance  of 
the  contract  proceeds. - 10  -
IV.  Overruns 
Now  that  86%  of  the  money  from  the  fourth  EDF  has  been  spent,  the  Commission 
is  in  a  position to give  an  initial assessment  of  cost  overruns  on  projects 
financed  by  that  Fund,  though  it  is  too  e~rly yet  to attempt  such  an 
exercise  for  the  fifth  Fund.  The  Commission  has  considered  both  the 
incidence  of  cost  overruns  and  possible  me3ns  of  preventing  their occurrence. 
A.  Incidence  of  overruns  ---------------------
1.  The  Commission's  investigations  revealed  a  volume  of  overruns  of 
57  370  000  ECU  on  84  projects to  a  total  value  (initial  commitments)  of 
345  328  000  ECU,  i.e.  an  increase  of  16.6%  overall. 
We  hasten  to  say,  however,  that  these  figures  are strictly marginal  in 
relation  to  total  fourth  EDF  commitments;  the  projects  concerned  account 
for  no  more  than  4.24%  by  number  and  11.4%  by  volume  of  that  Fund,  and  the 
total  overrun  accounts  for  just  1.90%  of total  commitments.  Note  also 
that  68  (or  80%)  of  the  overruns  found  amount  to  15%  or  Less  of  the  initial 
commitments  concerned,  below  the  ceiling  within  which  the  EDF's 
Chief  Authorizing  Officer  is  empowered  to  approve  additional  commitments 
(see  Article  56  of  the  Financial  Regulation  applicable  to  the  fourth  EDF), 
while  seven  fall  within  the  15%-50%  bracket  and  eight  in  the  50%-100% 
bracket.  In  only  one  case  did  an  overrun  exceed  100%. 
2.  Looking  at  the  reason  for  these  overruns,  the  underlying  causes  can  be 
divided  into three  broad  categories: 
- The  need  for  additional  funds  to  pay  for  the  extension  of  operations 
already  under  way  or  for  extra  work  and  supplies.  These  causes  account 
for  an  aggregate  overrun  of  20.8 million  ECU,  or  36.3%  of  the  total 
figure. 
Purely  financial  factors  such  as  price  inflation,  exchange  rate  movements, 
the  under-estimating  of  costs  prior to  issue  of  invitations  to  tender,  or 
payment  by  the  Community  of  costs  which  should  have  been  financed  by  the 
recipient  country.  Those  factors  underly  overruns  amounting  to 
20.5  million  ECU,  or  35.7%  of  the  total. - 11  -
- Increases  incurred  because  of  difficulties  ar1s1ng  with  implementation 
(unforeseen  contingencies  and  changes  to  the  initial  contract 
specifications).  Overruns  attributable to  these  causes  amount  to 
16.1  million  ECU,  28%  of  the  total. 
3.  These  figures  give  a  preliminary  idea  nf  the  scale  of  cost  overruns. 
At  this  stage  no  significant  trends  seem  to  emerge  from  a  comparison  of 
the  countries  or  sectors  concerned.  However,  the  Commission  reserves 
the  right  to  comment  in  greater detail  on  this at  a  later date  should 
more  pertinent  information  come  to  light  in  the  course  of  continuing 
implementation  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  EDF. 
1.  While  some  of  the  factors  mentioned  above  might  seem  to be  beyond 
reasonable  control,  linked  as  they  are  to cyclical  developments,  precautions 
are  nevertheless  possible.  In particular,  initial  cost  estimates  could 
be  mad~ more  accurate.  The  Commission  has  been  testing  the  approach  used 
by  other  donors  such  as  the  IBRD  and  the  FAC  whereby  the  invitations  to 
tender  are  issued before  the  financing  decision  is adopted,  so  that  at  the 
time  the  decision  is  taken,  better  information  is available  as  to  the  cost 
of  the  contract  or project. 
Here  are  the  figures  for  advance  invitations  to  tender  as  a  proportion of 
all  those  issued  in  the  years  concerned: 
- 1982:  18.5%  of  the  total  by  number  and  47.8%  of  the  total  by  value; 
- 1983:  24%  of  the  total  by  number  and  46%  of  the  total  by  value; 
- 1984:  24%  of  the  total  by  number  and  53%  of  the  total  by  value. 
2.  That  "experimental"  procedure  has  now  been  enshrined  in  the  new  Lome 
Convention  (Article 223(7)),  which  states  that 
11in order  to  cut  down  the 
likelihood of  overruns  to  a  minimum,  the  ACP  States  and  the  Community 
shall  make  every  effort  to  •••  issue  invitations  to  tender  before  taking 
the  financing  decision
11
• 
As  regards  Commission-administered  resources,  the  Commission  has  worked 
out  with  the  Member  States  a  number  of  groundrules  for  use  of  the  new  system 
in  the  interests of  ensuring  its transparency  and  efficiency. - 12  -
The  Council's  ACP-FIN  Working  Party  has  formulated  the  following  operating 
guidelines: 
the  EDF  Committee  must  give  prior  approval  for  the  issue  of  each  advance 
invitation  to  tender; 
- the  ACP-EEC  Courier  must  have  advance  notice  of  the  issue  of  all 
invitations  to  tender; 
- the  key  criterion  is  not  the  size  of  a  contract  but  its urgency;  a 
small  tender  may  be  just  as  urgent  as  a  Large  one,  and  this,  the 
urgency  of  the  work  or  supplies,  is  what  counts,  e.g.: 
•  works:  the  need  to  get  road  works  under  way  or  at  least  organize  the 
~before the  rainy  season; 
supplies:  the  need  to  supply  fertilizers  in  time  for  sowing  so  that 
a  whole  growing  season  is  not  Lost; 
the  object  of  the  exercise  should  be  borne  in  mind:  the  aim  is  to  get 
a  better  idea  of  prices  so  as  to  reduce  or  eliminate  the  risk  of 
overruns,  and  thus  the  advance  issue of  invitations  to tender  is called 
for  in  times  of  inflation  (whether  in  Europe  or  ACP  countries)  and  for 
complicated  projects  where  no  study,  however  detailed,  can  produce  as 
accurate  an  idea  of  costs  as  a  bid  from  interested  firms; 
-equality of  the  conditions  of  competition  is  important:  an  international 
invitation  to  tender  can  only  be  issued  on  the  basis  of  a  complete 
technical  and  administrative dossier;  tender  calls  in  advance  of 
financing  decisions  must  not  be  authorized  at  the  expense  of  a  proper 
invitation to  tender  dossier; 
- coordination  among  financing  bodies:  many  important  donors  use  the 
advance  invitation  to  tender  method;  in  the  interests of  coordination, 
therefore,  this  approach  should  be  followed  for  all  co-financed projects, 
whether  the  co-financing  is  joint  Ca  single  invitation to  tender  for  all 
funding  bodies)  or  parallel  (synchronization  of  the  invitations  to 
tender  issued  by  the  different  funding  bodies); - 13  -
- the  whole  operation  has  to  be  carefully  planned  from  start  to  finish; 
the  invitation to  tender  must  be  impeccably  timed  so that  (a)  the 
results  are  available  in  time  to make  any  necessary  adjustments  to the 
cost  estimate  derived  from  the  prelimin~ry study  and  (b)  the  contract 
can  be  concluded  - following  approval  by  the  EDF  Committee,  adoption  of 
the  financing  decision  and  the  signing  of  the  financing  agreement  -
within  the  ninety  day  period  for  which  tenders  are binding;  this means 
invitations to tender  must  be  issued  neither  too  late  nor  too early; 
- invitations  to  tender  must  be  issued  subject  to  financing  being  obtained 
from  the  Community,  i.e.  at  the  recipient  country's  own  risk;  this  must 
not  preclude  publication of  the  invitation to tender  in  the  Official 
Journal,  arrangements  for  simultaneous  publication with  the  recipient 
country,  and  compliance  with  the  prescribed  Community  procedures  (public 
opening  of  bids,  presence  of  the  Commission  Delegate,  and  approval  by 
the  Commission  - Brussels  or  Delegate  - of  the  results  of  the  invitation 
to tender). - 14  -
V.  Loan  recovery  problems 
The  worsening  economic  and  financial  situation of  many  ACP  States,  some 
of  which  have  been  forced  to  seek  debt  rescheduling  agreements  with  the 
IMF,  Paris  Club  or  London  Club,  has  had  direct  repercussions  on  the 
servicing  of  Community  loans  because of: 
- the  resultant  cash  flow  or  budgetary  problems  experienced  by  both 
business  and  governments; 
- balance  of  payments  problems  and  shortages  of  foreign  exchange,  which 
have  meant  sometimes  Lengthy  delays  for  the  Community's  customers  in 
obtaining  transfer  authorization  from  t9e  central  banks  or  monetary 
authorities of  the  countries  concerned; 
- the  deteriorating  financial  position  of  some  borrowers,  which  may  be 
chiefly  due  to  failure  on  the  part  of  a  government  to  take  necessary 
action  (e.g.  postponing  permission  for  price  rises despite  formal 
undertakings  given  to  lenders). 
Instances  of  Late  repayment  have  incr·eased;  but  above  all,  the  Length 
of  the  delays  has  increased  to  an  alarming  extent  despite  the  Bank's 
having  markedly  stepped  up  its appeals  and  demarches  to  the  borrowers 
and  authorities  of  the  ACP  States  concerned. 
While  the  outstanding  payment  situation and  the  short  and  medium-term 
prospects  are  not  yet  catastrophic,  they  are  worrying,  especially  where 
loans  from  the  Bank's  own  resources  are  concerned,  since  problems  of 
this  kind  can  affect  the  Bank's  general  credit  standing.  The  Bank's 
recovery  procedures  involve  prompt  and  timely  notification to  the 
guarantor  ACP  State  of  any  significant  repayment  delays,  followed  by 
repeated  reminders.  Where  payment  continues  to be  delayed  the  Bank 
advises  the  country  concerned  of  the  consequences  of  an  official 
calling-up of  its guarantee:  suspension  of  all  new  Lending  and  payment 
of  current  Loans  until  the  sums  owed  by  the  borrower  are  settled  in  full. 
1Despite  the  ACP  States'  undertakings  in  the  Conventions  (Article  67  of 
Lome  I  and  Article  158  of  Lome  II). - 15  -
To  date  it  has  almost  always  proved  possible  to  recover  outstanding 
payments  using  these procedures;  either the  monetary  authorities  of 
the  ACP  State  concerned  have  finally  put  the  necessary  foreign  currency 
at  the  borrower's  disposal,  the  government,  as  guarantor,  has  provided 
a  failing  borrower  with  an  advance  or  tu all  intents  and  purposes 
settled on  behalf  of  the  borrower,  or  eLse  the  Bank  has  contractually 
called  in  the  guarantee  and  the  country  ~oncerned has  fulfilled the, 
obligations  incumbent  on  it. 
The  only  time  this  procedure  failed to  work  was  the  LEC-Bushrod  loan, 
when  despite  repeated  demarches  by  the  Bank,  backed  by  the  Commission 
and  the  Commission  Delegate,  Liberia,  the  guarantor,  did  not  honour  its 
obligations  with  regard  to  two  payments  due  on  30  April  and 
31  October  1984  and  the  Bank  had  to turnf  as  a  Last  resort,  to  the 
guarantee  provided  by  the  Member  States. 
Where  loans  on  risk  capital  are  concerned  the  major  serv1c1ng  delays 
occur  with  operations  in  countries  suffering  from  particularly  severe 
financial  and  economic  problems  or  involving  borrowers  in  deeply 
troubled  sectors.  The  Bank  has  kept  up  repeated  pressure  and  the 
only  payments  now  Long  overdue  Cover  six  months  Late)  are  confined  to 
Liberia,  Rwanda  and  Sudan. 
The  only  postponement  of  payment  accorded  on  a  contractual  basis  is 
still that  relating  to  the  Gezira  Managil  Textile  Company  (GEMATEX)  in 
Sudan,  where  commissioning  of  the  mill  depends  on  a  satisfactory 
electricity  supply;  the  Sudanese  authorities  were  to  have  provided  this 
in  1983,  but  the  earliest possible date  is  now  1986.  The  servicing of 
a  risk  capital operation  and  two  special  Loans  granted  to  Chad  for  two 
industrial  projects  (Societe  Textile du  Tchad  and  Societe  Nationale 
Sucriere)  was  interrupted  from  1978  to  1982  because  of  the  civil  war 
but  in  the  end  the  Chad  authorities,  the  Commission  and  the  Bank 
between  them  came  to  a  most  satisfactory  agreement  and  nearly all  the 
outstanding  payments  have  now  been  cleared - the  last  three  repayments 
on  the  STT  loan  are  due  to be  made  very  shortly. 
1Following  repeated  demands  and  the  blocking  of  all  fresh  money  from 
the  Community  (including  aid  administered  by  the  Commission)  Liberia 
finally  paid  the  two  outstanding  instalments  and  the  Bank  immediately 
transferred  the  money  back  to  the  Member  States. - 16  -
In  the  case  of  Commission  special  Loans  the  Bank  is  simply  mandated  for 
recovery  and  arrears  of  payment  persist  (some  repayments  are  almost 
three  years  overdue)  despite  repeated  approaches  to  the  authorities  of 
the  countries  concerned,  which,  however,  are  only  a  handful  - Mauritania, 
Sudan  and  Guinea.  The  Bank  is  in  close  touch  with  the  Commission  and 
Commission  Delegates,  who  are  endeavouring  to  find  solutions  to  these 
problems.  Broadly  speaking,  the  situation appears  more  or  Less  to 
have  stabilized  for  the  moment,  and  there  is  no  marked  deterioration 
in  special  Loan  repayments. 
The  Commission  and  the  Bank  have  been  Looking  at  ways  of  achieving 
greater  solidarity  for  the  purposes  of  coordinated  action  to  improve  the 
servicing  of  Community  Loans  in  some  ACP  States,1  and  an  experiment 
involving  the  use  of  foreign  currency  equivalent  to  Local  expenditure 
on  EDF-financed  projects  to  pay  all  Community  Loans  is  currently  being 
tried 011t  for  the  first  time  in  Tanzania  by  agreement  with  the  government, 
with  some  success.  Repayments  for  the  second  half  of  1984  were  made 
without  too  much  delay;  the  experiment  will  continue  throughout  1985,  and 
it  is  to  be  hoped  the  method  can  be  used  elsewhere  in  future  (Article  227). 
1 Currently  under  consideration by  the  Council's  working  party  of  financial 
experts. - 17  -
VI.  Utilization of  aid 
Under  Article  25  of  the  Internal  Agreement  the  Commission  and  the  Bank 
are  required  to  ascertain  how  projects  financed  by  Community  aid are 
used  by  the  recipients  and  examine  the  extent  to which  the objectives 
of  financial  and  technical  cooperation  have  been  attained. 
For  its part,  the  Commission  believes  that  the  work  done  over  the  last 
few  years  on  ex  post  evaluation of  development  projects  fulfils  the 
function  described  above. 
Evaluations  undertaken  to date  fall  basically  into three  categories, 
setting aside  "i  La  carte" evaluation of  certain specific  points  carried 
out  at  the  request  of  the  department  concerned: 
1.  Sectoral  evaluation:  evaluations  have  been  carried out  for  the 
following  sectors: 
•  health  service 
•  rural  and  urban  water  supplies 
•  integrated agricultural  projects 
•  education  and  training 
•  roads 
•  Livestock  production. 
2.  System  evaluation:  to  date  the  following  instruments  of  development 
cooperat1on  have  been  evaluated: 
•  micro-projects  and  projects  co-financed  with  NGOs 
•  Stabex 
•  food  aid 
•  technical  assistance. 
3.  Comprehensive  evaluation of  all sectors, development  instruments  and 
non-Community  aid  programmes  in  a  given  country  or  region;  the  following 
evaluations  have  been  carried out: 
•  Cameroon 
•  Niger 
•  Rwanda 
•  Senegal 
.  Zaire 
•  Zambia - 18  -
Discussion  papers  and  summary  reports  were  produced  for  each  of  the  above 
evaluation exercises. 
In  some  cases  meetings  of  ACP/EEC  experts  and  representatives  from  the 
Member  States  took  place  for  the  purpose  of  working  out  certain  "basic 
principles"  for  a  given  field.  The  following  such  seminars  have  been 
held: 
.  December  1978,  Freetown,  Sierra  Leone:  health, 
.  November  1979,  Bamako,  Mali:  drinking  water  supplies; 
•  February  1981,  Lome,  Togo:  agricultural  development; 
•  March  1982,  Addis  Ababa,  Ethiopia:  education  and  training; 
•  May-June  1983,  Niamey,  Niger:  roads; 
•  January  1984,  Nairobi,  Kenya:  livestock  production; 
•  April  1984,  Harare,  Zimbabwe:  technical  assistance. 
The  "basic  principles''  drawn  up  at  those  meetings  go  to  the  ACP-EEC  Council 
for  approval  and  are  then  disseminated  widely  amongst  all  interested parties. 
The  Member  States  are  thus  supplied  with  information  at  the  key  stages  of 
the  evaluation  process;  the  Commission  therefore  sees  no  need  to  provide 
details  in  this  report  of  the  way  in  which  recipient  countries  use 
Community  aid,  and  would  refer  Member  States  to the  comprehensive 
documentation  they  have  already  received. - 19  -
The  Bank's  supervisory  and  follow-up  procedures  broadly  take  the  same  form 
for  operations  inside  and  outside  the  Community.  In  addition,  the  same 
basic  banking  criteria are  observed  - as  indeed  is the  case  with  project 
appraisal  too  - both  for  Loans  from  the  Bank's  own  resources  and  operations 
for  which  it  has  received  a  special  mandate.  The  procedures  are  designed 
to enable  the  Bank  to  supervise  and  monitor  the  execution  and  subsequent 
operation of  projects  it finances.  Assessments  are  based  on  periodical 
reports  which  borrowers  are  contractually  required  to  furnish  (project 
progress  reports,  financial  statements  and  other  financial  information), 
on-site  inspections,  and  contacts  and  talks  with  borrowers,  the 
authorities  of  the  ACP  State  concerned,  and  co-financing  bodies.  The 
Bank's  findings  are  then  set  out  in  in-house  reports  which  examine  and 
analyse  the  main  features  of  the  operations  being  financed.  Where 
special  problems  occur,  conclusions  and  recommendations  for  action  are 
regularly  submitted  to  the  Bank's  decision-making  bodies. 
To  date  it  has  not  been  the  Bank's  practice to carry  out  systematic 
ex  post  evaluations  of  the  real  impact  and  full  consequences  of  projects 
financed  either  inside or  outside  the  Community.  However,  its work  of 
analysis  allows  efficient  supervision  of  the  use  to  which  aid  is  put  and 
a  broad  assessment  of  the  extent  to which  its objectives  have  been  or  are 
Likely  to be  attained.  This  is  a  question to which  the  Bank  is  currently 
devoting  considerable  thought. 
The  conclusions  reached  by  the  Bank  on  the basis  of  this  work  over  the 
past  two  or  three  years  indicate  a  number  of  key  problems,  generally 
related to  the  economic  and  financial  difficulties besetting  certain 
ACP  States.  Here  are  examples,  in  no  particular order  of  importance, - 20  -
of  the  main  problems  which  have  affected  projects  financed  by  the  Bank: 1 
(a)  government  price  freezes  or  delays  in authorizing  price  rises,  or 
prices  set  too  Low  - Societe  Sucriere  de  La  COMO!  csosuco,  formerly 
SOSUHV),  in  Burkina  Faso;  Moulin  du  Sud-ouest  (MSO)  in  Ivory  Coast; 
Bamburi  Portland  Cement  and  South  Nyanza  Sugar  (SONYSUGAR)  in  Kenya; 
National  Electric  Power  Authority  CNEPA)  in  Nigeria; 
(b)  taxation or  inadequate  administered  prices  for  local  raw  materials  -
Societe  Textile  du  Cameroun  pour  le  Linge  de  maison  CSOLICAM); 
Societe  Miniere  du  Rwanda  CSOMIRWA); 
(c)  reconsideration of  or  delays  in  implementing  intergovernmental 
agreements  - regional  projects:  Ciments  del
1 Afrique  de  L
10uest 
CCIMAO),  and  the  RAN  project; 
(d)  particularly  severe or  persistent  political  unrest  -Societe Textile 
du  Tchad  CSTT);  Societe  Nationale  Sucriere  du  Tchad  CSONASUT). 
1we  have  cited projects  which  represent  typical  instances  of  the  problems 
considered  and  may  be  commented  on  in detail  when  this  report  is 
examined. - 21  -
In  addition  to  the  above,  the  following  factors  also  caused  problems: 
(e)  cyclical  factors  and  worldwide  recession occasioning  low  or  falling 
prices  for  export  commodities  - the Dwangwa  Sugar  Corporation  (DSC) 
project  in  Malawi;  Royal  Swaziland  S•Jgar  Corporation  (RSSC); 
Generale  des  Carrieres et  des  Mines  <GECAMINES)  in  Zaire;  Zambia 
Consolidated  Copper  Mines  (ZCCM); 
(f)  the  inadequacy  of  management  structures  or  technical  assistance  -
the  NEPA  project  in  Nigeria,  SOMIRWA  in  Rwanda,  and  the  Societe 
Nationale  pour  le  Developpement  de  La  Palmeraie  et  des  Huileries 
(SONAPH)  1n  Togo; 
(g)  unfavourable  market  trends  or  production  capacity  failing  to  reach 
forecast  levels  - the  Novotel  hotel  project  in  Ivory  Coast  and  the 
"Gaweye"  hotel  project  in  Niger;  Poura  gold  mine  in  Burkina  Faso; 
MSO  in  Ivory  Coast;  Industries  Chimiques  du  S~n;gal  CICS);  SICOR  in 
Ivory  Coast; 
Ch)  exceptional  or  persistent  drought  conditions,  which  directly  or 
indirectly affected  many  of  the projects  financed  by  the  Bank  -
agricultural  or  hydro-electric  projects  (particularly  severely  hit 
was  the  SONAPH  project  in  Togo); 
(i)  problems  with  the  supply  of  local  raw  materials  (the  Kenya  Furfural 
Company  CKFC)  project). 
At  the  same  time  the  depressed  Level  of  economic  activity  in  a  number  of 
ACP  States  has  directly affected  the  financial  position of  many  small 
businesses  receiving  support  from  development  banks  to  which  the  Bank 
has  accorded  global  loans;  the  development  banks  are  accordingly 
experiencing  severe  problems  with  payment  arrears  which  in  some  cases 
have  seriously upset  their  financial  structure:  Kenya's  Industrial 
Development  Bank  (!DB),  the  TDFL  in  Tanzania  and  the  Development  Bank 
of  Zambia  CDBZ). 
In  Liaison  with  the  other  co-financing  agencies  concerned,  the  Bank  is 
continually  engaged  with  the  project  promoters  and  government  authorities 
concerned  in  endeavours  to  analyse  the  causes  of  problems  which  have 
arisen  and  seek  suitable  ways  of  achieving  the  objectives  laid down. 
Prospects  for  some  of  the  projects  are  already  Looking  up,  but  elsewhere 
the  problems  are  far  from  solution and  the  outlook  for  some  schemes  is 
very  bleak  Cthe  GEMATEX  project  in  Sudan,  CIMAO,  the  KFC  in  Kenya  and 
the  MSO  in  Ivory  Coast). - 22  -
VII.  External  indebtedness  of  ACP  States 
The  external  debt  burden  is  a  major  problem  of  Third  World  countries 
which  has  recently  been  occupying  the  headlines.  While  discussion  has 
mainly  centred on  Latin  America,  debt  problems  also affect  a  number  of 
ACP  countries  which  have  been  hard  hit  by  falling  export  earnings  due 
to  the  slump  in  commodity  prices. 
(a)  In  1982  ACP  public  debt  totalled $51.4 billion  (an  increase  of  nearly 
ninefold  since  1970)  or  12.3%  of all  developing-country  debt.1 
Of  that  amount,  $750  million  is  owing  to  Community  institutions 
C$450  million  to  the  EIB  and  $300  million  to  the  EDF),  representing 
1.5%  of  total  ACP  debt. 
(b)  If  the  Community  accounts  for  such  a  small  proportion  of  the  total, 
it  is  because  aid  accorded  under  the  Lome  Conventions  is primarily 
in  grant  form;  the  weighted  average  grant  element  of  all  EDF  funds 
is  94%  (including  the  subsidization of  interest  rates  on  loans 
granted  by  the  EIB  from  its own  resources). 
The  degree  of  concessionality  of  aid  under  Lome  II  is  also  reflected 
in  the  breakdown  of  programmed  aid.  In  the  case  of  the  35  least-
developed  ACP  countries,  89%  of  the  aid  was  in grant  form,  compared 
with  79%  for  the  other  ACP  States.  In  addition,  when  the  definitive 
totals  of  the  Lome  II  indicative  programmes  were  settled  it  was 
decided  that  90  million  ECU  which  was  to  have  been  used  for  special 
Loans  under  those  programmes  would  be  given  in grant  form  instead, 
the  aim  being  to  improve  the  financial  situation of  the  14  countries 
concerned.  This  is  one  example  of  the  Community's  flexibility  and 
pragmatism  towards  ACP  States suffering  severe  problems  of 
indebtedness. 
1A Lower  figure  is  obtained  for  the  ACP  States  by  looking  at  debt 
servicing  costs,  which  amount  to only  9%  of  the  developing-country 
total,  a  probable  reflection  of  the generally  softer  Loan  terms  offered 
by  the  Community. - 23  -
A number  of  Community  aid  resources  also  indirectly  help  lighten  the 
debt  burden  of  the  ACP  States.  Three  are  particularly  noteworthy: 
- the  appropriations  in  the  Community's  general  budget  for  food  aid 
operations,  which  constitute  a  significant  help  to  ACP  States' 
balance  of  payments; 
- the  use  of  a  delegated  paying  agent  to deal  with  local  expenditure; 
this  provides  an  inflow  of  foreign  exchange,  as  the  Commission 
makes  transfers  to  the  ACP  States  in  European  currencies  to  cover 
these  costs,  which  amount  to nearly  47%  of  EDF  spending; 
- Community  participation  in  co-financing  operations,  which  often acts 
as  a  catalyst  for  further  flows  of  finance  to  ACP  borrowers  on  more 
favourable  terms  than  they  could  otherwise  have  obtained.  This  is 
explained  by  the  Community's  own  credit  standing  and  the  fact  that 
it often  agrees  to  take  responsibility  for  the  financing  of 
start-up operations,  supplying grants or  special  loans  to  finance 
infrastructure or  the  non-profit-making  components  of  a  project. 
(c)  The  pressing  nature  of  the  debt  problem  and  the  magnitude  of  the 
difficulties it  causes  were  kept  in  mind  during  the  negotiations  for 
Lome  III,  which  contains  a  number  of  provisions  directly  concerned 
with  ACP  indebtedness: 
- a  general  clause  provides  that  at  the  ACP  States'  request  the 
Community  shall  Lend  technical  assistance  in  studying  and  finding 
practical solutions  to their debt,  debt-servicing  and  balance of 
payments  problems  (Article  198); 
- there  are  also  more  specific  provisions  dealing  with  the  problem  of 
debt-servicing;  one  of  the  criteria  for  deciding  the  method  of 
financing  where  the  Bank's  own  resources  are  concerned  is  that 
"account  shall  be  taken  of  factors  guaranteeing  the  service  of 
repayable  aid"  <Article  197(4));  similarly,  another  new  clause, 
Article  229(5),  provides  that  "in  order  to  contribute  towards  the 
servicing  of  the  debt  resulting  from  Community  Loans  from  the 
Bank's  own  resources,  special  loans  and  risk  capital,  the  ACP 
States  may,  in  accordance  with  arrangements  to be  made  on  a 
case-by-case  basis  with  the  Commission,  use  the  available  foreign - 24  -
currency  fin  the  accounts  of  the  paying  agent~7 as  and  when  debt 
repayments  fall  due  and  up  to the  amounts  required  for  payments 
in  national  currency". 
(d)  However,  these  evidences  of  concern  about  ACP  indebtedness  must  not 
be  seen  as  tending  towards  one  conceivable  radical  solution:  an 
across-the-board  measure  to  relieve  the  ourden  of  ACP  debts  to  the 
Community  by  outright  cancellation or  consolidation. 
Such  a  step would  be  inappropriate,  given  that  these  debts  make  up 
only  a  small  proportion  of  ACP  States•  total  indebtness  (see  above). 
In  any  case,  a  general  relief  measure  would  not  necessarily 
operate  to the  advantage  of  ACP  States, either: 
- directly,  since  it would  harm  the  creditworthiness  of  those  with 
access  to capital  markets,  or: 
- indirectly,  since  it would  also  diminish  the  EIB
1s  creditworthiness 
on  those  markets  (and  hence  the  terms  on  which  it  can  borrow  or 
lend),  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  Bank•s  credit  depends  partly 
on  the  value  of  its  current  Loans.  The  same  arguments  would 
apply  to  a  measure  directed  solely at  special  Loans.  A debt 
relief  measure  confined  to  special  Loans  would  in  any  case  be  of 
minimal  benefit  to  the  ACP  States  in  terms  of  their  immediate  or 
future  balance  of  payments  situation. 
Nor  would  across-the-board debt  relief  benefit  all  ACP  States 
equally;  in  many  cases  the  beneficiaries  would  be  those  who  are 
already  better off. 
Finally,  such  a  measure  could  amount  in  some  cases  to the  prov1s1on 
of  assistance  to  the  irresponsible  rather  than  the  truly  needy. 
That  would  be  most  unfortunate,  since  there  is  Little prospect 
that  debt  relief  would  be  granted  in  addition  to  normal  Community  aid. - 25  -
Accordingly,  the  Community  does  not  intend  to embark  on  a  course 
whose  attractions  are  more  apparent  than  real, and  which  would 
teach  the  countries  concerned  the  wrong  development  lessons.  The 
institutions  concerned  prefer  the  sensible  use  of  the  instruments 
available  to them  in the  new  Convention  as  a  means  of  making  a 
more  constructive  contribution to helping  their  ACP  partners  with 
their debts. 